Abstract. Multi-resource fair allocation has been a hot topic of resource allocation.
Introduction
With the ever-growing demand for cloud resources, multi-resource (such as CPUs, memory, and bandwidth) fair allocation became a fundamental problem in cloud computing systems. The traditional slot-based scheduler for state-of-the-art cloud computing frameworks (for example, Hapdoop) can lead to poor performance, unfairly punishing certain workloads. Ghodsi et al. [2] proposed a compelling alternative known as the dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism, which is designed for Leontief preferences. DRF is to maximize the minimum dominant share of users, where the dominant share is the maximum share of any resource allocated to that user. DRF is generally applicable to multi-resource environments where users have heterogeneous demands, and is now implemented in the Hadoop Next Generation Fair Scheduler.
In recent years, DRF has attracted much attention and been generalized to many dimensions. Joe-Wong et al. [7] designed a unifying multi-resource allocation framework that captures the trade-offs between fairness and efficiency, which generalizes the DRF measure. Gutman and Nisan [3] situated DRF in a common economics framework, obtaining a general economic perspective. Parkes et al. [5] extended DRF in several ways, including the presence of zero demands and the case of indivisible tasks. Wang et al. [6] generalized the DRF measure into the cloud computing systems with heterogeneous servers. Most recently, Zarchy, Hay and Schapira [8] developed a framework for fair resource allocation that captures such implementation tradeoffs by allowing users to submit multiple resource demands.
DRF uses complete information about the requirements of all agents in order to find the fair solution. However, in reality, agents arrive over time, and we do not know the requirements of forthcoming agents before allocating the resources to the arrived agents.
Recently, Kash, Procaccia and Shah [4] introduced a dynamic model of fair allocation and proposed a dynamic DRF mechanism. They mentioned that a dynamic DRF solution can be found by using water-filling algorithm or solving the corresponding linear program.
However, the running time of the water-filling algorithm is pseudo-polynomial in worstcase scenario. Although solving a linear program can be done within polynomial time, the running time is high. It is desired to design an efficient algorithm to find a dynamic DRF solution.
In this paper, we further study the dynamic DRF mechanism. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic DRF mechanism. Section 3
gives the competitive ratios analysis of the dynamic DRF mechanism. Section 4 presents a polynomial-time algorithm, which can find a dynamic DRF solution in O(k) time at every step k. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and gives the future work.
Dynamic Dominant Resource Fairness
Throughout this paper, assume that resources are divisible. In a multi-resource environment, there are n agents and m resources. Each agent i requires D ir -fraction of resource r for each task, assuming that D ir > 0 for each resource r. As defined in [2] [4, 5] , the normalized demand vector of agent i is given by
In the dynamic resource allocation model considered in [4] , agents arrive at different times and do not depart. Assume that agent 1 arrives first, and in general agent k arrives after agents 1, . . ., k − 1, for k ≥ 2. For convenience, we say that agent k arrives in step k. An agent reports its demand which does not change over time when it arrives. Thus, at step k, demand vectors d 1 , . . ., d k are known, and demand vectors d k+1 , . . ., d n are unknown. At each step k, a dynamic DRF mechanism produces an allocation A k over the agents present in the system, where A k allocates A k ir -fraction of resource r to agent i, subject to the feasibility condition
Under the dynamic DRF mechanism, assume that allocations are irrevocable, i.e.,
ir , for every step k ≥ 2, every agent i ≤ k − 1, and every resource r. At every step k, assume A k is non-wasteful, which means that for every agent i there exists y ∈ R + such that for every resource r, A
. . , k, and r = 1, 2, . . . , m.
At every step k, the dynamic DRF mechanism [4] starts from the current allocation among the present agents 1, . . . , k and keeps allocating resources to agents that have the minimum dominant share synchronously, until a k/n fraction of at least one resource is allocated.
Formally, at every step k, the dominant share vector (x k 1 , . . . , x k k ) of the dynamic DRF allocation A k can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
As shown in [4] , the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies many desired properties. Especially, it satisfies sharing incentives (SI) and dynamic Pareto optimality (DPO). SI means that, for all steps k and all agents i ≤ k, x k i ≥ 1/n, i.e., when an agent arrives it receives an allocation that it likes at least as much as an equal split of the resources. DPO means that, for all steps k, there is a resource r such that
.e., it should not be possible to increase the allocation of an agent without decreasing the allocation of at least another user, subject to not allocating more that k/n fraction of any resource.
is defined as
The maxsum objective
When the objective is the sum of dominant shares maximization (maxsum, for short), for a given instance I, the optimal solution (ẋ
in the offline setting can be obtained by solving the following program
Accordingly, the competitive ratio CR 1 of the dynamic DRF mechanism for the maxsum objective can be defined as
Theorem 1. When the objective is the sum of dominant shares maximization, the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism is 1/m, and the ratio is tight.
Proof. Since dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies SI, we have x k i ≥ 1/n for every agent i ≤ k at step k, which implies that
Consider the optimal solution (ẋ
for every resource r, following from the fact d ir * i = 1 and the capacity constraint of (5).
It implies that
where the first inequality follows from the fact that each agent has at least one dominant resource. Thus, following (7) and (9), we have
i.e., the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism is at least 1/m.
Next, we will prove that the competitive ratio is tight. Consider a setting with m (≥ 2) resources and n (≫ m) agents. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n − m, the demand vector of agent i is d i = (1, 1, . . . , 1). For agents i = n − m + 1, n − m + 2, . . . , n, the demand vectors are (1, ǫ, . . . , ǫ), (ǫ, 1, . . . , ǫ), · · · , (ǫ, ǫ, . . . , 1), respectively, where ǫ → 0 is a small enough number. It is easy to verify that the dynamic DRF mechanism produces a solution with
at step n. The optimal solution will allocate all resources to last the m agents, obtaining a solution witḣ
andẋ n i = 0 for other agents. Thus, the competitive ratio is
When n is large enough, the ratio approaches 1/m. Thus, the theorem holds.
The maxmin objective
When the objective is minimum dominant share maximization (maxmin, for short), the optimal solution (ẍ k 1 , . . . ,ẍ k k ) at step k (≥ 2) in the offline setting can be obtained by solving the following program [2, 5] , where the dominant shares of all agents are equal. Formally, for a given instance I, at every step k, (ẍ
following from [3, 5] .
Therefore, the competitive ratio CR 2 of the dynamic DRF mechanism for the maxmin objective can be defined as Proof. At every step k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, since the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies the SI property, we have
By the pigeonhole principle, there exists a source which is the dominant resource for at least ⌈k/m⌉ agents. It implies that the DRF solution (ẍ
Thus, the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies
Consider a setting with m (> 2) resources and n = m 2 +1 agents. For i = 1, 2, . . . , m 2 , the demand vector of agent i is defined as
where ǫ → 0 is a small enough number. The demand vector of agent n = m 2 + 1 is
following from the assumption of ǫ. Actually, after the first m 2 steps, at least m 2 /(m 2 + 1)
share of at least one resource r * must be exhausted for any dynamic mechanism satisfying the DPO property. It implies that at most 1/(m 2 + 1) share of resource r * is left for the last agent n. Hence,
for any dynamic mechanism satisfying DPO, while the DRF solution (ẍ n 1 , . . . ,ẍ n n ) satisfies
It implies that, at step k = n, the competitive ratio of any dynamic mechanism satisfying DPO including the dynamic DRF mechanism is at most
Thus, the theorem holds.
Lemma 1. At any step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it holds that
Lemma 2. At any step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all agents i, j such that i < j, it holds that
Theorem 3. At any step k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, a dynamic DRF solution can be found within
Proof. Consider an agent j. By Lemma 1, we have
, by Lemma 2, for all agents i ≥ j, we
Thus, if we know τ , M k can be obtained by solving the following linear program
As pointed in [5] , this linear program can be rewritten as
We are now ready to describe our linear-time algorithm. Our main idea is to find τ by using a bisection method. At any step k ≥ 2, consider the agent
, for i < l;
For convenience, let
, ∀r; The complete algorithm is given as Linear-time dynamic DRF algorithm in Appendix.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have analyzed the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism, which shows that the dynamic DRF mechanism is a nearly optimal mechanism satisfying DPO for the maxmin objective. We have described a non-trivial polynomial-time algorithm to find a dynamic DRF allocation, whose running time is linear in the number of present agents at every step, improving the result in [4] .
Note that another fair allocation mechanism, called cautious LP, is proposed in [4] .
Cautious LP achieves near optimal maxmin value at the last step. However, since cautious LP violates the DPO property and allocates too many resources at the last several steps, it is unfair to compare cautious LP with dynamic DRF for the maxmin objective. It is interesting to analyze the competitive ratio of the cautious LP mechanism under different objectives. Since solving the linear program takes too much time, it is challenging to develop a combinatorial algorithm to find a cautious LP solution as in Section 4.
